Fundamental Properties of Full-Duplex Radio for Secure Wireless
  Communications by Hua, Yingbo et al.
1Fundamental Properties of Full-Duplex Radio for
Secure Wireless Communications
Yingbo Hua, Qiping Zhu, Reza Sohrabi
Abstract—This paper presents a number of fundamental prop-
erties of full-duplex radio for secure wireless communication
under some simple and practical conditions. In particular, we
consider the fields of secrecy capacity of a wireless channel
between two single-antenna radios (Alice and Bob) against an
unknown number of single-antenna eavesdroppers (Eves) from
unknown locations, where Alice and Bob have zero knowl-
edge (except a model) of the large-scale-fading channel-state-
information of Eves. These properties show how the secrecy
capacity is distributed in terms of the location of any Eve, how
the optimal jamming power applied by the full-duplex radio
varies with various parameters, and how bad or good the worst
cases are. In particular, these properties show how the quality of
self-interference cancelation/suppression affects various aspects
of the fields of secrecy capacity. The cases of colluding Eves and
non-colluding Eves are treated separately and yet coherently.
For non-colluding Eves, asymptotically constant fields of secrecy
capacity are revealed. For each of the two cases, we also treat
subcases with or without small-scale fading.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication1 is already firmly embedded in
people’s lives around the world. Secure wireless communi-
cation is important for all of us from individuals and families
to institutions and governments. Yet, the physical medium for
wireless communication is intrinsically open to all wireless
devices in any given space, time and bandwidth. This makes
wireless communication particularly vulnerable to eavesdrop-
ping.
For secure communication, cryptography at the network
and upper layers is an efficient, effective and indispensable
tool [1]. Cryptography also makes wireless communication
highly secure against eavesdropping as long as secret keys
are kept secure and renewed frequently. However, when a
secret key itself is distributed through wireless channels, the
physical layer security becomes essential for secure wireless
communications. A recent survey on physical layer security is
available in [2], and a more general survey on wireless security
is shown in [3].
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1“Wireless communication” and “wireless communications” are considered
interchangeable.
In this paper, we are interested in physical layer security
via the use of full-duplex radio. A full-duplex radio is able
to transmit and receive at the same time and same frequency,
which differs from the conventional radio which only transmits
and receives, respectively, in two separate time slots or at
two separate frequencies. While research continues in order
to improve the quality of full-duplex radio, prototypes of full-
duplex radio can be found in [4] and the references therein.
A full-duplex radio is uniquely equipped for secure wireless
communication. As a full-duplex radio receives a secret key
from another radio, it can also transmit jamming noise2 at the
same time and same frequency to prevent eavesdroppers (Eves)
from receiving the same key. It is this intrinsic characteristic
of full-duplex radio that has recently drawn much interest in
exploiting full-duplex radio for secure wireless communica-
tion. Such examples include fast power allocation for both a
transmitter and a jamming receiver in a multicarrier setting
[5], utilization of full-duplex for secure decentralized wireless
network [6], resource allocation [7] and a hierarchical game [8]
against an active full-duplex Eve [8], optimal power allocation
for a multiuser MISO network against multiple Eves [9], and
an early effort where MIMO full-duplex is exploited [10].
Many more relevant works can be found from the references
therein.
However, a common assumption made in all these prior
works is that the legitimate radios (such as Alice and Bob)
know exactly how many Eves are nearby and also the large-
scale-fading channel-state-information (L-CSI) of all Eves.
This assumption is difficult to justify. If an Eve is passive
and hidden (as it is often the case), it is virtually impossible
for another radio to know its presence and let alone its L-CSI.
Even if an Eve is active, its L-CSI is still hard to estimate
without knowing either its location or its transmitted power.
In other words, for most realistic situations, there is no way
for a legitimate radio to know how many Eves are nearby,
where they are, or what their L-CSI is.
In this paper, we focus on two basic schemes for key
distribution (or any secret information3) between two single-
antenna radios (called Alice and Bob) in the presence of
single-antenna Eves, where we do not assume that Alice and
Bob have any knowledge of the number of Eves, their locations
or their L-CSI. We will adopt a reasonable model of L-CSI to
map between L-CSI of any possible Eve and its approximate
location. For small-scale-fading channel-state-information (S-
2The idea of using radio jamming to prevent adversaries from receiving
secret information dates back at least to the era of World War II.
3If jamming is mainly used for exchange of secret keys, it would not overly
interfere the rest of the network.
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2CSI), we will use the Rayleigh-amplitude statistical model
as is commonly used and well justified for scattering-rich
mobile environment. Based on the above models, we will study
the field of the secrecy capacity of Alice and Bob, which
is a function of the location of Eve. If the field is positive
everywhere in the space where Eves could reside, then there
is a positive secrecy capacity against any and all Eves in the
space.
The primary findings of this work will be highlighted in a
list of properties and, where effective, by illustrative figures.
Some of these properties may be more important than others,
some may be more surprising than others, and some of the
proofs may be more straightforward than others. But we feel
that they all provide fundamental insights into how the secrecy
capacity of the studied system is distributed in terms of the
(unknown) location of Eve, what and where the worst cases
are, and how the jamming power from a full-duplex radio
and the quality of its self-interference cancellation/suppression
affect the fields of secrecy capacity.
This paper should be easy to read since the mathematical
tools used in this paper are little more than what a college-level
training in mathematics and statistics provides for engineering
students. All proofs that are tedious manipulations are omitted.
But for all results, we will at least provide the right directions
(if not obvious) for readers to verify by themselves.
For the rest of this paper, we will start with mathematical
normalization of the problem in section II where we remove
all redundant variables that are easy to deal with whenever
needed. We will treat the case of colluding Eves in section III
and the case of non-colluding Eves in section IV. The work
in section III is also very much coherent with that in section
IV although the two cases are totally different scenarios in
applications. In each of the two sections, we first handle the
situation without small-scale fading and then the situation with
small-scale fading. The final remarks are given in section V.
II. MATHEMATICAL NORMALIZATION
If Alice uses the power P ′T to transmit a key to Bob, and
Bob (a full-duplex radio) receives the key and also sends out
a jamming noise of the power P ′J , then the channel capacity
4
from Alice to Bob usable for the packet of the key is known
(e.g., see [11]) to be
CA,B = log2(1 + SNRA,B) (1)
with SNRA,B =
g′P ′T
P ′N,B+ρ
′P ′J
where g′ is the squared ampli-
tude of the (actual) channel gain from Alice to Bob, P ′N,B is
the (actual) variance of the background noise at Bob, and ρ′ is
the squared amplitude of the (actual) residual self-interference
(SI) channel gain of Bob. The residual SI channel gain
results from a combined effect of SI suppression at all stages,
including antenna SI isolation, radio-frequency front-end SI
cancellation and baseband SI cancellation. For principles of SI
cancellation, see [12], for example, and the references therein.
4All capacity expressions in this paper have the unit in bits per channel use
or equivalently in bits per second per Hertz.
At the same time, the channel capacity from Alice to Eve
is
CA,E = log2(1 + SNRA,E) (2)
with SNRA,E =
a′P ′T
P ′N,E+b
′P ′J
where a′ is the squared amplitude
of the (actual) channel gain from Alice to Eve, b′ is the squared
amplitude of the (actual) channel gain from Bob to Eve, and
P ′N,E is the (actual) variance of the background noise at Eve.
To remove all redundant variables, we will use the following
normalized variables: PT
.
=
g′P ′T
P ′N,B
, PJ
.
=
g′P ′J
P ′N,B
, ρ .= ρ
′
g′ , a
.
=
a′P ′N,B
g′P ′N,E
and b .=
b′P ′N,B
g′P ′N,E
, which are uniquely corresponding to
P ′T , P
′
J , ρ
′, a′ and b′, respectively, as long as Alice and Bob
know the actual channel gain between them and the actual
noise variances at all nodes. For convenience, we will assume
that the variance of the background noise5 is the same for all
nodes.
With the normalized variables, we can rewrite SNRs in (1)
and (2) as follows6:
SNRA,B =
PT
1 + ρPJ
(3)
SNRA,E =
aPT
1 + bPJ
(4)
We will use the expressions of (3) and (4) for the case without
small-scale fading. In the case with small-scale fading, we will
make modifications later.
Because of the above normalization, we will use the fol-
lowing terminology without loss of generality:
1) The distance between Alice and Bob is one, and the
large-scale fading gain between them is one. Both nodes
are located on the x-axis of a two-dimensional plane7:
Alice is at (−0.5, 0), and Bob is at (0.5, 0). Eve’s
location is denoted by (x, y). See Fig. 1.
2) The large-scale fading factor from Alice to Eve is
denoted by a = 1dαA with dA =
√
(x+ 0.5)2 + y2, and
the large-scale fading factor from Bob to Eve is denoted
by b = 1dαB with dB =
√
(x− 0.5)2 + y2. Here, α ≥ 2
is the path loss exponent.
3) The residual SI channel gain8 of a full-duplex radio is
ρ. If ρ (= ρ
′
g′ ) is less than one, it means that the actual
amount of self-interference suppression used in the full-
duplex radio is more than the large-scale path loss from
Alice to Bob. It is important to remember that for a full-
duplex radio with a fixed and actual residual SI channel
gain ρ′, ρ can be larger or smaller than one depending
on the actual channel gain g′ between Alice and Bob.
4) The transmitted power9 from Alice is PT > 0. The
jamming power from Bob is PJ ≥ 0. And the noise
variance at all nodes is one.
5which includes thermal noise from within the device and radio noise from
numerous sources of both man-made and nature-made
6With zero impact on reading, we will choose to ignore adding the period
“.” at the end of an equation line that is also the end of a sentence.
7There is no loss of generality here since the 2-D results in this paper can
be easily mapped into the 3-D space by a rotation around the x-axis.
8For convenience, we will also refer to “squared amplitude of channel gain”
as “channel gain” unless clarification is needed.
9We assume that PT is strictly larger than zero because if PT = 0 there
would be no transmission of information.
3Fig. 1. Normalized coordinates.
The rest of this paper is divided into two cases: colluding
Eves and non-colluding Eves. For each case, we also consider
two subcases with or without small-scale fading.
III. WITH COLLUSION AMONG EAVESDROPPERS
We do not need to assume that Alice or Bob knows the
number of Eves or the locations of Eves. But in this section,
we assume that there could be collusion among all Eves at
unknown locations. This means that if one Eve at one location
steals a key, then all other Eves at any locations may also know
the key.
A. Without small-scale fading
The secrecy capacity of the channel from Alice to Bob
against Eve at location (x, y) is known (e.g., see [2]) to be
SA,B,x,y = [CA,B − CA,E ]+ (5)
where (x)+ = max{0, x}. Then, the secrecy capacity of the
channel against all possible Eves is obviously the worst case:
SA,B = min
x,y
SA,B,x,y (6)
We will see that without any constraint on (x, y), SA,B would
be always zero. However, it is practical to assume10 that there
is a radius ∆ around Alice within which there is no Eve.
Naturally, this radius could be small or large, depending on
applications. Hence, we will define the secrecy capacity in this
case as
SA,B = min
x,y,dA≥∆
SA,B,x,y (7)
In order to understand this secrecy capacity, it is sufficient
to understand how SA,B,x,y is distributed in terms of (x, y),
which is studied next.
Define a SNR ratio:
λx,y
.
=
SNRA,B
SNRA,E
=
1 + bPJ
a(1 + ρPJ)
(8)
Obviously, Sx,y > 0 iff (if and only if) λx,y > 1. In terms of
λx,y , SA,B,x,y has the following expression:
SA,B,x,y =
{
(log2 e)
(
1− 1λx,y
)+
SNRA,B , PT → 0
(log2 λx,y)
+
, PT →∞
(9)
10Strictly speaking, this is a tiny amount of CSI about Eves. But this is
negligible compared to the conventional definition of CSI.
The following property shows a deeper insight into the con-
ditions under which the secrecy11 SA,B,x,y is positive.
Property 1: Let γ = a−1b−ρa . Then, SA,B,x,y > 0 iff
1) b− ρa > 0 and PJ > γ; or
2) b− ρa < 0 and PJ < γ; or
3) b− ρa = 0 and a < 1.
Proof: The proof is straightforward based on the state-
ment following (8).
The condition b−ρa > 0 means that ρ must be small enough
for the given a and b while b− ρa < 0 requires ρ to be large
enough. Keep in mind that both a and b are strictly positive
and depend on Eve’s location (x, y). Also, iff a > 1, dA < 1
(Eve is inside the unit circle around Alice); and iff b < 1,
dB > 1 (Eve is outside the unit circle around Bob). In order
to view Property 1 geometrically, let us define the following
four regions:
1) Region R1: b− ρa > 0 and a < 1.
2) Region R2: b− ρa > 0 and a ≥ 1.
3) RegionR3: b−ρa ≤ 0 and a < 1. This region vanishes12
iff ρ ≤ 12α .
4) Region R4: b− ρa ≤ 0 and a ≥ 1.
Then, Property 1 implies:
Property 2:
1) If (x, y) ∈ R1, then SA,B,x,y > 0 for any PJ ≥ 0.
2) If (x, y) ∈ R2, then SA,B,x,y > 0 iff PJ > γ.
3) If (x, y) ∈ R3, then SA,B,x,y > 0 if PJ = 0.
4) If (x, y) ∈ R4, then SA,B,x,y = 0 for any PJ ≥ 0.
Proof: It follows from Property 1.
For R3, it will be shown later that arg maxPJ SA,B,x,y = 0,
i.e., PJ = 0 is optimal. We see that unless Eve is in R4,
there is PJ ≥ 0 such that SA,B,x,y is positive. Therefore, in
order to have an overall positive secrecy, i.e., SA,B > 0, it is
necessary that R4 ⊂ RdA<∆ (i.e., R4 belongs to the region
where dA < ∆). One can verify that for ∆ ≤ 1,R4 ⊂ RdA<∆
iff ρ < ∆
α
(1+∆)α . (Note that if ∆ > 1, then by definition ofR4, R4 ⊂ RdA≤1 as always, and hence R4 ⊂ RdA<∆ for
any ρ.) For example, if ∆ = 0.1 and α = 2, then we need
ρ < 0.008 ≈ −21dB (i.e., SI suppression needs to be 21dB
more than the path loss from Alice to Bob).
In order to visualize Property 2, we need to visualize the
region Rρ defined by b− ρa > 0:
Property 3:
1) If ρ = 1, then b− ρa > 0 is equivalent to x > 0.
2) If ρ < 1, then b− ρa > 0 is equivalent to
(x+ x0)
2 + y2 > r2ρ (10)
with x0 = 1+ρ
2
α
2(1−ρ 2α )
> 12 and rρ =
√
x20 − 14 . That is,
Rρ is everywhere outside a circular disk in the left half
plane, and Alice is inside the disk.
3) If ρ > 1, then b− ρa > 0 is equivalent to
(x+ x0)
2 + y2 < r2ρ (11)
which means thatRρ is now everywhere inside a circular
disk in the right half plane, and Bob is inside this disk.
11For convenience, secrecy capacity is also referred to as secrecy.
12i.e., the two inequalities do not hold at the same time.
4Fig. 2. Illustration of R1, R2, R3 and R4 for ρ > 1.
Fig. 3. Illustration of R1, R2, R3 and R4 for ρ < 1. R3 vanishes iff
ρ < 1
2α
.
Proof: The proof is straightforward.
The four regions R1, R2, R3 and R4 are illustrated in
Figs. 2-3. Illustrated in Fig. 4 is the case where R4 shrinks
into RdA<∆.
Property 4: Given ρ < 12α , PJ > 0 and RPJ
.
= {(x, y) ∈
Rρ|PJ ≤ γ}, then SA,B,x,y = 0 iff (x, y) ∈ R4 ∪RPJ .
Proof: Under ρ < 12α , R4 ⊂ RdA<1. If (x, y) ∈ R4, we
know that SA,B,x,y = 0. If (x, y) /∈ R4 but (x, y) ∈ RPJ , then
we must have b − ρa > 0 and a > 1 so that PJ ≤ γ, which
implies by Property 1 that SA,B,x,y = 0. If (x, y) /∈ R4∪RPJ ,
then SA,B,x,y > 0 by Property 2.
This property says that for a fixed PJ > 0, there is an
additional ring outside R4 where SA,B,x,y = 0. This ring
diminishes as PJ becomes infinite.
Property 5:
1) Provided SA,B,x,y > 0, SA,B,x,y decreases if a increases
(Eve moves towards Alice) or b decreases (Eve moves
away from Bob).
2) Let ρ < ∆
α
(1+∆)α with ∆ ≤ 1. Subject to PJ > γ,
(x∗, y∗) .= arg min
(x,y)∈RdA≥∆
SA,B,x,y = (−∆− 0.5, 0)
Fig. 4. Illustration of R4 ⊂ RdA<∆ iff ρ < ∆
α
(1+∆)α
assuming ∆ ≤ 1.
Fig. 5. SA,B,x,y vs (x, y) with PJ =
√
PT
ρ
, ρ = 0.1 and α = 2. The
darkest blue region is R4 ∪RPJ .
Fig. 6. SA,B,x,y vs (x, y) with PJ =
√
PT
ρ
, ρ = 0.01 and α = 2. The
darkest blue region is R4 ∪RPJ .
i.e., the most harmful location of Eve subject to PJ > γ
and dA ≥ ∆ is at ∆ distance to the left of Alice.
Also note (x∗, y∗) = arg max(x,y)∈RdA≥∆ CA,E =
arg min(x,y)∈RdA≥∆ λx,y = arg min(x,y)∈RdA≥∆
b
a .
Proof: Part 1 is obvious from the definition of SA,B,x,y
where SNRA,B is independent of a and b, and SNRA,E is
an increasing function of a but a decreasing function of b. To
prove Part 2, we first use Part 1 which suggests that for a
fixed a = 1dαA , the minimum of SA,B,x,y is achieved by the
smallest b which is b = 1(1+dA)α . Then, subject to dA ≥ ∆,
SA,B,x,y is minimized by the above a and b with dA = ∆,
which corresponds to (x, y) = (−∆− 0.5, 0).
Shown in Figs. 5-6 is how SA,B,x,y is distributed over (x, y)
subject to PJ =
√
PT
ρ . We will see that the choice of PJ =√
PT
ρ is an asymptotical form of the optimal jamming power.
In these two figures, the secrecy SA,B,x,y is zero in R4∪RPJ
which is the darkest blue region. We see that R4∪RPJ shrinks
as ρ becomes smaller.
Property 6: Let PJ,opt,x,y
.
= arg maxPJ SA,B,x,y. Then:
1) For (x, y) ∈ R1,
PJ,opt,x,y =
[
γ +
√
γ2 + β
]+
≥ 0 (12)
with γ = a−1b−ρa and β =
ab−ρ+aPT (b−ρ)
ρb(b−ρa) .
2) For (x, y) ∈ R2, PJ,opt,x,y is strictly positive and given
by the equality in (12).
3) For (x, y) ∈ R3, PJ,opt,x,y = 0.
Proof: One can verify that if SA,B,x,y > 0, then
∂SA,B,x,y
∂PJ
=
(log2 e)PT
g(PJ)
(−c2P 2J + c1PJ + c0) (13)
5where the numerator is a quadratic function of PJ and the
denominator is always positive:
g(PJ) = (1+ρPJ+PT )(1+ρPJ)(1+bPJ+aPT )(1+bPJ) > 0
(14)
and also
c2 = ρb(b− ρa) (15)
c1 = 2ρb(a− 1) (16)
c0 = ab− ρ+ aPT (b− ρ) (17)
The stationary point of PJ at which
∂SA,B,x,y
∂PJ
= 0 has
obviously two possibilities: c1±
√
c21+4c0c2
2c2
.
In region R1 where b− ρa > 0 and a < 1, we have c2 > 0
and c1 < 0. But c0 can be positive, zero or negative. If c0 > 0,
we see that ∂SA,B,x,y∂PJ is positive for small PJ and negative for
large PJ , and hence SA,B,x,y must be maximized by
PJ,opt,x,y =
c1 +
√
c21 + 4c0c2
2c2
= γ +
√
γ2 + β > 0 (18)
But if c0 ≤ 0, then ∂SA,B,x,y∂PJ < 0 for all PJ ≥ 0, and hence
SA,B,x,y is maximized by PJ = 0.
In region R2 where b−ρa > 0 and a ≥ 1, we have c2 > 0,
c1 ≥ 0 and c0 > ba [a2 − 1 + aPT (a − 1)] ≥ 0. In this case,
we see that ∂SA,B,x,y∂PJ is positive for small PJ and negative for
large PJ , and hence SA,B,x,y is maximized by the same PJ
as shown in (18).
In region R3 where b−ρa ≤ 0 and a < 1, we have c2 ≤ 0,
c1 < 0 and c0 ≤ ba [a2 − 1 + aPT (a − 1)] < 0, and hence
SA,B,x,y is maximized by PJ = 0.
Recall that for regionR4, SA,B,x,y = 0. So, only if b−ρa >
0 (i.e., for (x, y) ∈ R1∪R2), PJ needs to be positive. Unless
mentioned otherwise, we will assume b− ρa > 0.
Obviously, with b− ρa > 0, we have γ > 0 iff a > 1. And
β > 0 if (not only if) a > 1. Also as ρ → 0, γ becomes
negligible compared to β, and hence PJ,opt,x,y =
√
β =√
a(1+PT )
ρb . For Figs. 5 and 6, we have used this asymptotical
form of PJ,opt,0,0 with large PT , i.e., PJ =
√
PT
ρ .
If we let PJ = PJ,opt,x,y , one can verify that
λx,y =
{ √
b
ρa , PT → 0 and ρ→ 0
b
ρa , PT →∞
(19)
The previous results of PJ,opt,x,y depend on (x, y), which
are not directly useful. We need to know the worst case of
PJ,opt,x,y .
Property 7: Subject to (x, y) ∈ R2, i.e., b − ρa > 0 and
a ≥ 1:
1) As a increases (Eve moves towards Alice), both γ and
β increase and hence PJ,opt,x,y increases.
2) As b decreases (Eve moves away from Bob), both γ
and β (although not as obvious) increases and hence
PJ,opt,x,y increases.
3) Subject to dA ≥ ∆, arg maxx,y PJ,opt,x,y = (x∗, y∗).
In other words, when Eve is at (x∗, y∗), not only
the secrecy is minimum but also the optimal required
jamming power is maximum.
Proof: Part 1 is obvious from (12). Part 2 for γ is also
obvious. To prove the property of β in part 2, one can verify
that
∂β
∂b
=
−a(1 + PT )b2 + 2(1 + aPT )ρb− a(1 + aPT )ρ2
ρb2(b− ρa)2
(20)
where the numerator, denoted by N(b), is upper bounded as
follows:
N(b) ≤ max
b
N(b) = N(b)|
b=
(1+aPT )ρ
a(1+PT )
= −ρ
2(1 + aPT )[(a
2 − 1) + a(a− 1)PT ]
a(1 + PT )
≤ 0 (21)
where the equality in the last inequality holds only for a =
1. The proof of part 3 is as follows. For a fixed a = 1dαA ,
maxb=1/dαB PJ,opt,x,y is achieved by b =
1
(dA+1)α
which is the
minimum of b subject to a = 1dαA . Furthermore, one can verify
that subject to a = 1dαA and b =
1
(dA+1)α
, both γ and β increase
as dA decreases. Hence, subject to dA ≥ ∆, maxx,y PJ,opt,x,y
is achieved by (x∗, y∗).
An important implication of Property 7 is that if we know
that Eves can only exist outside the disk dA < ∆, then the
worst case in terms of both the secrecy SA,B,x,y and the
optimal jamming power PJ,opt,x,y is when Eve is at (x∗, y∗) =
(−∆ − 0.5, 0), and the overall secrecy SA,B is optimized if
we choose PJ = PJ,opt,x∗,y∗ . Namely, the optimal value of
SA,B is given by SA,B,x∗,y∗ with PJ = PJ,opt,x∗,y∗ .
B. With small-scale fading
We now consider small-scale fading. In this case, the
secrecy capacity SA,B,x,y is still given by (5) with (1) and (2).
But the SNRs in (3) and (4) need to be revised as follows:
SNRA,B =
A˜PT
1 + ρB˜PJ
(22)
SNRA,E =
aC˜PT
1 + bD˜PJ
(23)
where A˜, B˜, C˜, D˜ are small scale fading factors. We can
assume that Alice and Bob know A˜ and B˜ but not C˜ and
D˜. In principle, Alice and Bob can make decisions based on
the knowledge of A˜ and B˜. Since the large-scale fading is
already taken care of, we can assume that A˜, B˜, C˜ and D˜ are
i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed) and each has the
exponential pdf (probability density function) e−u with u ≥ 0.
Note that the amplitudes of all channel gains are proportional
to the square-roots of these factors and hence are Rayleigh-
distributed. Due to the random nature of C˜ and D˜ in particular,
SA,B,x,y is now random. We will be interested in probabilities
of zero secrecy and/or their upper bounds, which should be
made small for good security.
We know that the secrecy SA,B,x,y is zero if and only if
SNRA,B ≤ SNRA,E or equivalently,
C˜ − v1D˜ − v2 ≥ 0 (24)
with
v1 =
bA˜PJ
a(1 + ρB˜PJ)
(25)
6Fig. 7. The shaded region is defined by (24).
v2 =
A˜
a(1 + ρB˜PJ)
(26)
Notice that if PJ increases, v1 increases and v2 decreases. The
region defined by (24) is illustrated by the shaded area in Fig.
7.
Property 8:
1) The conditional probability of zero secrecy, conditional
upon A˜ and B˜, is
P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} =
∫ ∞
0
dv
∫ ∞
v1v+v2
e−u−vdu
=
e−v2
1 + v1
<
1
1 + v1
(27)
2) Subject to dA ≥ ∆, arg maxx,y P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} =
(x∗, y∗), i.e., the worst location of Eve is the same as
shown before.
3) If Eve is arbitrarily close to Alice, the probability
of zero secrecy is one, i.e., P{SA,B,−0.5,0=0|A˜,B˜} =P{SA,B,−0.5,0=0} = 1.
4) In general, the unconditional probability of zero secrecy
is:
P{SA,B,x,y=0} = E{P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜}} < E
{
1
1 + v1
}
(28)
where the upper bound is a decreasing function13 of PJ
and is maximized when Eve is at (x∗, y∗) subject to
dA ≥ ∆.
Proof: For Part 1, we see that P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} is
equivalent to P{C˜−v1D˜−v2≥0} which equals the integral of the
joint pdf of C˜ and D˜ over the shaded region shown in Fig. 7.
For part 2, note that P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} decreases as v1 and/or
v2 increase, or equivalently, as a decreases and/or b increases.
So, for a fixed a = 1dαA , arg maxb P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} =
arg minb v1 =
1
(dA+1)α
. Then, subject to a = 1dαA ,
b = 1(dA+1)α and dA ≥ ∆, arg maxdA P{SA,B=0|A˜,B˜} =
arg mindA v1 = arg mindA v2 = ∆. Part 3 follows by using
a =∞ and b = 1 (i.e., v1 = 0 and v2 = 0) in (27). Part 4 is
obvious.
Although the optimal jamming power in terms of the upper
bound (28) on the unconditional probability of zero secrecy
P{SA,B,x,y=0} is infinite, it is not yet clear whether the optimal
jamming power in terms of the conditional probability of zero
13Due to v2 in (27), the monotonic property of the exact P{SA,B,x,y=0}
in terms of PJ has so far no proof.
secrecy P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} is also infinite. Keep in mind that
the choice of PJ can be based on A˜ and B˜ which are known
to Alice and Bob.
One can verify that
∂P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜}
∂PJ
=
−A˜e−v2(a1PJ + a0)
(a(1 + ρB˜PJ) + bA˜PJ)2(1 + ρB˜PJ)
(29)
with a1 = ρB˜[a(b−ρB˜)−bA˜] and a0 = a(b−ρB˜). We see that
each of a0 and a1 can be either positive or negative. If a0 > 0
and a1 > 0, then P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} is always a decreasing
function of PJ and hence the optimal value PJ,opt,x,y of PJ
is infinite. If a0 > 0 and a1 < 0, then there is a finite
optimal power, i.e., PJ,opt,x,y = a0−a1 . If a0 < 0, which also
implies a1 < 0, then P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} is always an increasing
function of PJ , for which PJ,opt,x,y = 0.
We see that depending on the realizations of A˜ and B˜,
the optimal jamming power could be zero, finite or infinite.
However, one can verify that the condition where a0 > 0 and
a1 > 0 is equivalent to B˜ < bρ and A˜ < a(1− ρb B˜), which is
also equivalent to A˜ < a and B˜ < bρ (1− A˜a ). This observation
leads to:
Property 9:
1) A lower bound on the probability of P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜}
being a decreasing function of PJ is:
Prob
{
A˜ < a and B˜ <
b
ρ
(
1− A˜
a
)}
=
∫ a
0
du
∫ b
ρ (1−ua )
0
e−u−vdv
= 1− b
b− ρae
−a +
ρa
b− ρae
− bρ .= P (30)
2) Let bρ = ηa with η > 1. Then,
P = 1− 1
η − 1 [ηe
−a − e−ηa] =
{
1, a =∞
1− e−a, η =∞
(31)
and P increases rapidly to one as a increases for any
η > 1.
Proof: The proof is straightforward.
For example, if ∆ = 0.1, α = 2 and η = 1.01 (i.e., ρ ≈
−21dB), then at (x∗, y∗), P = 1−2.3×10−42. This example
suggests although in general the optimal jamming power may
be finite depending on A˜ and B˜, almost surely the (worst-case)
conditional probability of zero secrecy is a decreasing function
of PJ for which the optimal jamming power is infinite14.
Shown in Fig. 8 are the unconditional probability of zero
secrecy P{SA,B,x∗,y∗=0} and its upper bound given by (28)
with ∆ = 0.1, α = 2 and η = 1.01. The gap of the bound
is small (intuitively because of the small v2 in e−v2 in (27)).
We see that P{SA,B,x∗,y∗=0} is about 0.5 for PJ ≥ 40dB. If
we use 10 transmissions of 10 keys under independent small-
scale fading, we could have the unconditional probability of
14In practice, this should be translated into a maximum allowed jamming
power.
7Fig. 8. P{SA,B,x∗,y∗=0} and its upper bound given by (28) with ∆ = 0.1,
α = 2 and η = 1.01 (ρ = 21dB).
Fig. 9. With small-scale fading and subject to A˜ = B˜ = 1, SA,B,x,y versus
(x, y) with PJ =
√
PT
ρ
, ρ = 0.1 and α = 2.
zero secrecy guaranteed to be less than 2−10 everywhere
subject to dA ≥ 0.1. Note that zero secrecy of the 10
transmissions happens iff each of the 10 transmissions has
zero secrecy. In other words, if any of the transmissions
has a positive secrecy, the overall secrecy is positive15. To
achieve independent small-scale fading between transmissions
in scattering-rich environments, Alice and Bob can simply
move their locations by a short distance in the order of half-
wavelength after each transmission.
Shown in Fig. 10 and 9 are examples of SA,B,x,y versus
(x, y) with small-scale fading subject to A˜ = B˜ = 1. In these
figures, the step size in each of x and y directions is 0.01.
For each sample of (x, y), an independent realization of C˜
and D˜ is used. We see that due to small-scale fading, even in
region R4 the conditional probability of zero secrecy is not
zero (unless a =∞ or dA = 0).
The conditional probability of zero secrecy
P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} in (27) can be used by Alice and Bob for
opportunistic transmission of secret keys. In scattering-rich
environment, A˜ and B˜ can change significantly after a small
amount (in the order of half-wavelength) of location change of
Bob. (Note that a location change of Alice would affect A˜, C˜
and D˜ significantly but likely do little for B˜. This is because
the self-interference channel of Bob is mainly affected by
objects around Bob.) In particular, for mobile ad hoc network
(MANET), Alice and Bob could both move around until
P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} is small enough. Based on (25), (26) and
(27), we see that P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} is minimized by the
largest A˜ and the smallest B˜.
15In practice, one would need a bit of extra margin of a positive secrecy
so that the security is reliable subject to unknown errors.
Fig. 10. With small-scale fading and subject to A˜ = B˜ = 1, SA,B,x,y
versus (x, y) with PJ =
√
PT
ρ
, ρ = 0.01 and α = 2.
Fig. 11. Lower bound on CDF of P{SA,B,x∗,y∗=0|A˜,B˜} with ρ = 0.01
and (x∗, y∗) = (−∆− 0.5, 0) = (−0.6, 0).
For opportunistic transmission of secret keys, it is useful
to consider the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} as well as its dependence on PJ . A closed-
form CDF of the exact P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} seems intractable to
find. But using the upper bound in (27), one can verify the
following lower bound on the CDF of P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜}:
F{A,B,x,y}(p) .= Prob{P{SA,B,x,y=0|A˜,B˜} ≤ p}
> Prob
{
1
1 + v1
≤ p
}
= e
− a(1−p)bPJp bp
bp+ aρ(1− p) (32)
where 0 < p ≤ 1. A simple dependence of the lower bound
of F{A,B,x,y}(p) on PJ is very clear in (32). One can also
verify that if PJ =∞,
F{A,B,x,y}(p) = bp
bp+ aρ(1− p) (33)
which means that the inequality in (32) becomes equality
under PJ =∞.
Shown in Fig. 11 is the CDF lower bound given by (32).
For example, we see that at PJ = 30dB, there is at least a
10% chance (with respect to the random A˜ and B˜ that are
known to Alice and Bob) that P{SA,B,x∗,y∗=0|A˜,B˜} < 20%
(with respect to the random C˜ and D˜ that are unknown to
Alice and Bob). In other words, for any given 0 < p < 1, the
larger is the CDF lower bound, the more likely can Alice and
Bob encounter such A˜ and B˜ that the conditional probability
of zero secrecy is less than p.
8IV. WITHOUT COLLUSION AMONG EAVESDROPPERS
Now we consider the case where there is no collusion
among Eves. Namely, all Eves act as isolated individuals. To
reveal the fundamentals, we continue to assume the simple
system discussed so far. But in this section, we also assume
that Alice and Bob are both full-duplex radios and of equal
characteristics in terms of PT , PJ and ρ.
To take the advantage of no collusion among Eves, we
consider a dual-phase transmission scheme. In phase 1, Alice
first sends a random key K1 to Bob while Bob receives the
key and also jams Eves in full-duplex mode. In phase 2, Bob
sends another random key K2 to Alice as Alice receives the
key and also jam Eves in full-duplex mode. Following the
dual-phase scheme, each of the two nodes has the same pair
of keys (K1,K2) as their secret information.
The above scheme was inspired by a scheme in [13] where
a so-called iJam was proposed for conventional half-duplex
radios. In phase 1 of iJam, Alice sends a random key K1 over
N subcarriers to Bob while Bob jams Eves over a random
subset S1 of N2 subcarriers and receives samples over the
other subset S2 of N2 subcarriers. Then, Alice repeats the same
process while Bob jams Eves over S2 and receives samples
over S1. Combining the un-jammed samples received during
the two transmissions in phase 1, Bob recovers K1. In phase
2 of iJam, the roles of Alice and Bob are reversed, and after
two repeated transmissions from Bob, Alice receives another
key K2 from Bob.
To compare our scheme with iJam conveniently, we will
call our scheme fJam. The main differences between fJam and
iJam are:
1) For the same pair of keys, iJam could require up to twice
as much spectral resource as fJam requires.
2) The header of each transmitted packet by iJam is not
jammed and is completely transparent to Eves while
fJam jams the entire packet of each transmission. It
is important to note that the header of a packet also
carries important information such as pilots for channel
estimation.
3) A random S1 in iJam has a finite number C
N
2
N =
N !
(N2 !)
2 < 2
N of possibilities. Under iJam, Eve is in
theory able to recover both keys through exhaust search
although the computational complexity is increased by
(C
N
2
N )
2 times when compared to no jamming. In other
words, the secrecy capacity of iJam is actually zero. But
under fJam, the secrecy capacity can be easily made
positive, and no Eve is even in theory able to recover
both keys correctly with infinite computational power.
A. Without small-scale fading
As long as the time taken between the two phases is small
enough, we can assume that the location and channel response
of any Eve is unchanged. The secrecy capacity of fJam against
Eve at unknown location (x, y) is therefore:
Sx,y =
1
2
(SA,B,x,y + SB,A,x,y) (34)
with SA,B,x,y = (CA,B − CA,E)+, SB,A,x,y = (CB,A −
CB,E)
+, CA,B = log2(1 + SNRA,B), CB,A = log2(1 +
Fig. 12. With PJ = 0, Sx,y > 0 iff (x, y) is not in the dark blue region
(i.e., the “almond-shaped” region).
Fig. 13. “There is PJ ≥ 0 such that Sx,y > 0” iff (x, y) is not in the dark
blue region which vanishes iff ρ < 1.
SNRB,A), CA,E = log2(1 + SNRA,E), CB,E = log2(1 +
SNRB,E) and
SNRA,B = SNRB,A =
PT
1 + ρPJ
.
= SNR (35)
SNRA,E =
aPT
1 + bPJ
(36)
SNRB,E =
bPT
1 + aPJ
(37)
The overall secrecy capacity of fJam against all Eves should
be S = minx,y Sx,y , which could also be subject to some
constraint on (x, y) if there is any prior knowledge of the
locations of Eves. Clearly, in order to understand S, it is
sufficient to understand Sx,y as a function of (x, y). In
particular, we are interested in the worst cases of Sx,y .
We see that Sx,y is symmetric between a and b since it
is an average of SA,B,x,y and SB,A,x,y. Recall Property 2.
There are four unique regions of SA,B,x,y, i.e., Ri with i =
1, 2, 3, 4, which can be rewritten as Ri = Ri(a, b) to stress its
dependence on a and b. Therefore, for SB,A,x,y, there must be
corresponding four regions which we can denote by R¯i with
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and R¯i = Ri(b, a). Similarly, we will write
Rρ = Rρ(a, b) and R¯ρ = Rρ(b, a). Also, γ = γ(a, b) and
γ¯ = γ(b, a). Therefore, we have:
Property 10:
1) If PJ = 0, then Sx,y > 0 iff (x, y) /∈ RdA≤1 ∩RdB≤1.
2) “There is PJ ≥ 0 such that Sx,y > 0” iff (x, y) /∈
R4 ∩ R¯4.
3) “For arbitrary (x, y), there is PJ ≥ 0 such that Sx,y > 0”
iff ρ < 1.
Proof: The proof is easy based on Property 2.
Part 1 of Property 10 is illustrated in Fig. 12. Part 2 of
Property 10 is illustrated in Fig. 13 with ρ > 1. Part 3 says
that in order to have a positive secrecy against Eve at any
location we must have ρ < 1. We will assume ρ < 1.
9The general landscape of Sx,y is a function of ρ, PT and PJ ,
and is more complicated than that of SA,B,x,y. In particularly,
unlike SA,B,x,y, Sx,y does not in general increase or decrease
monotonically with respect to either a or b. But an important
and tractable region of Sx,y is along the x-axis and the y-axis,
which will be focused on next.
Property 11: Assume (x, y) ∈ Rρ ∩ R¯ρ and PJ >
max{γ, γ¯}. Then, S0,0 is the minimum of Sx,y along the y-
axis, and S0,y increases as |y| increases.
Proof: It is easy to verify that under the stated condition,
Sx,y = log2(1 + SNR)−
1
2
log2 Tx,y (38)
with
Tx,y = (1 + SNRA,E)(1 + SNRB,E)
=
(1 + bPJ + aPT )(1 + aPJ + bPT )
(1 + bPJ)(1 + aPJ)
(39)
Let x = 0. Then, a = b = 1
(0.25+y2)α/2
and T0,y =(
1 + aPT1+aPT
)2
which decreases as |y| increases and has its
maximum at y = 0. Hence, S0,y increases as |y| increases
and has its minimum at y = 0.
But along the x-axis, Sx,y is no longer as monotonic as it
is along the y-axis. The pattern of Sx,0 is highly sensitive to
the choice of PT and PJ :
Property 12: Assume ρ < 1 and PJ > 1−2
−α
1−ρ . Then, S0,0
is a local maximum along the x-axis if
PJ >
−1 +√1 + 2α+1PT
2α+1
(40)
If the inequality is reversed, S0,0 is a local minimum along
the x-axis.
Proof: The stated condition complies with that of Prop-
erty 11 and hence (38) holds. One can verify that for y = 0
and a small x 6= 0,
Tx,0 = T0,0 +
α222(α+1)
(1 + 2αPJ)2
[(
1 +
2αPT
1 + 2αPJ
)2
P 2J − (PJ − PT )2
]
x2
(41)
If PJ ≥ PT , (41) obviously implies that Tx,0 > T0,0 and hence
T0,0 (S0,0) is a local minimum (maximum) along the x-axis.
But more generally, S0,0 is a local maximum along the x-axis
if the coefficient of x2 in (41) is positive. One can verify that
this condition is equivalent to 2α+1P 2J +2PJ −PT > 0 which
is also equivalent to (40). The converse is obvious.
We now look deeper into Sx,0. For convenience, we let d =
dA, a = 1dα and b =
1
(1−d)α . Then log2 Tx,0 = log2 Td−0.5,0
which is a function of d with d = x + 0.5. Assuming the
condition of Property 11, one can verify that16
∂ log2 Sx,0
∂x
= −1
2
∂ log2 Tx,0
∂x
= − log2 e
2
N(d)
D(d)
(42)
16For compact expressions, we assume α is even.
with
D(d) =
(
1 +
PJ
(1− d)α +
PT
dα
)(
1 +
PJ
(1− d)α
)
·
(
1 +
PJ
dα
+
PT
(1− d)α
)(
1 +
PJ
dα
)
> 0 (43)
N(d) = −αPJP 2T d
α−1 − (1− d)α−1
d2α(1− d)2α
+ αPT
dα+1 − (1− d)α+1
dα+1(1− d)α+1 + 2αPJPT
d2α+1 − (1− d)2α+1
d2α+1(1− d)2α+1
+ αP 2JPT
(
2
dα − (1− d)α
d2α+1(1− d)2α+1 +
d3α+1 − (1− d)3α+1
d3α+1(1− d)3α+1
)
+ αP 3JPT
d2α − (1− d)2α
d3α+1(1− d)3α+1 + αP
2
T
2d− 1
dα+1(1− d)α+1 (44)
Due to the symmetry Sx,0 = S−x,0, we only need to consider
x ≥ 0 (i.e., d ≥ 0.5). We see that all terms in N(d) are
negative if d > 1. Hence, under the condition of Property
11, Sx,0 is an increasing function of x for x > 0.5. It is also
interesting to see that if 1 > d > 0.5, all terms in N(d) except
the first term are positive, and the first term is dominated by
some other terms if PJ is large enough. So, if PJ is large
enough, Sx,0 must be a decreasing function of x for 0 < x <
0.5, which is consistent with Property 12.
Also note that all terms in N(d) except the first term change
their sign as d increases across the value of one. Furthermore,
one can verify:
Property 13: Under the condition of Property 11, if we let
x→ 0.5, then
∂ log2 S(x, 0)
∂x
= − log2 e
2
α
0.5− x (45)
Proof: The proof is based on (42), where only the
dominant term is kept.
This property shows a singularity of the derivative of Sx,0
near x = 0.5. However, one can also verify that under the
condition of Property 11, the requirement x → 0.5 means
that PJ →∞ and ρ→ 0. So, (45) should be appreciated only
under these asymptotical conditions. Clearly, for a fixed pair of
PJ and ρ, (45) does not reflect the actual pattern of Sx,0 when
x is so close to 0.5 that (x, 0) /∈ Rρ∩R¯ρ or PJ ≤ max{γ, γ¯},
which will be further discussed later.
We now compare the secrecy between the left and right sides
of Bob. At a ∆-distance to the left of Bob, a = 1(1−∆)α and
b = 1∆α . Under the condition of Property 11 with ∆ 1 and
hence PJ  1 (but PTPJ can be arbitrary), one can verify that
SNRA,E = ∆
α(1 + α∆)PTPJ , SNRB,E = ∆
−α(1 − α∆)PTPJ
and hence
T0.5−∆,0
=
(
1 + ∆α(1 + α∆)
PT
PJ
)(
1 + ∆−α(1− α∆)PT
PJ
)
= 1 + ∆−α(1− α∆)PT
PJ
+ (1− α2∆2)P
2
T
P 2J
(46)
Similarly, at the same ∆-distance but to the right of Bob, one
can verify that
T0.5+∆,0 = 1 + ∆
−α(1 + α∆)
PT
PJ
+ (1− α2∆2)P
2
T
P 2J
(47)
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Fig. 14. “Flat near-field” with PJ =
√
PT
ρ
, α = 2, ρ = 0.1 (i.e., log2
1
ρ
=
3.3).
We see that T0.5+∆,0 − T0.5−∆,0 = 2α∆1−α PTPJ > 0. It
follows:
Property 14: Under the condition of Property 11, the secrecy
capacity at a short distance to the right of Bob (or the left of
Alice) is smaller than that at the same distance to the left of
Bob (or the right of Alice).
The optimal jamming power to maximize Sx,y is difficult
to analyze in general due to the need to find the roots of
a 4th-order polynomial in PJ . If we use the origin as the
reference location, we know S0,0 = SA,B,0,0 = SB,A,0,0
and hence arg maxPJ S0,0 = arg maxPJ SA,B,0,0 = PJ,opt,0,0
where PJ,opt,x,y is given in (12). For small ρ and large PT ,
one can verify that
PJ,opt,0,0 =
√
PT
ρ
(48)
Property 15: If PJ =
√
PT
ρ which is invariant to (x, y),
ρ < ∆
α
(1+∆)α , 1 > dA > ∆, 1 > dB > ∆, and ∆
α
√
ρPT  1,
then
Sx,y = log2
1
ρ
(49)
which is invariant to (x, y).
Proof: It follows that ab
√
ρPT > ∆
αa
√
ρPT >
∆α
√
ρPT  1 and a
√
PT
ρ > a
√
ρPT >
√
ρPT >
∆α
√
ρPT  1. Similarly, ba
√
ρPT  1, b
√
PT
ρ  1
and
√
ρPT  1. Then, one can verify that SA,B,x,y =
log2
1
ρ − log2 ab > 0 and SB,A,x,y = log2 1ρ − log2 ba > 0,
which implies (49).
This property shows that under large PT , small ρ and PJ =√
PT
ρ , there is a constant secrecy region in a “near-field”. But
if
√
ρPT  1 and Eve is far way from Alice and Bob, then one
can verify that Sx,y = 12 log2
PT
ρ , which is a constant secrecy
in a “far-field” and as expected much larger than that in the
near-field. Illustrated in Figs. 14 and 15 is the constant near-
field secrecy capacity. We see that at PT = 60dB, (49) is a
good approximation of the near-field secrecy for both ρ = 0.1
and ρ = 0.01.
We now consider the case where (x, y) is so close to
(±0.5, 0) that (x, y) /∈ Rρ ∩ R¯ρ or PJ ≤ max{γ, γ¯} (i.e.,
one of the conditions of Property of 11 is violated).
Property 16: Assume ρ < 12α so that R3 and R¯3 do not
exist, and R4 and R¯4 are the complements of Rρ and R¯ρ
Fig. 15. “Flat near-field” with PJ =
√
PT
ρ
, α = 2, ρ = 0.01 (i.e., log2
1
ρ
=
6.6).
respectively. Recall RPJ = {(x, y) ∈ Rρ|PJ ≤ γ} and define
R¯PJ = {(x, y) ∈ R¯ρ|PJ ≤ γ¯}. Then,
1) For (x, y) ∈ R4 ∪RPJ : Sx,y = 12SB,A,x,y and, if PJ >
0, maxx,y Sx,y = S−0.5,0 = 12 log2(1 + SNR).
2) For (x, y) ∈ R¯4 ∪R¯PJ : Sx,y = 12SA,B,x,y and, if PJ >
0, maxx,y Sx,y = S0.5,0 = 12 log2(1 + SNR).
Proof: First recall Property 4. Then consider that for
PJ > 0, SNRA,E approaches zero as (x, y) approaches
(0.5, 0), and SNRB,E approaches zero as (x, y) approaches
(−0.5, 0).
This property says that with PJ > 0, Sx,y actually peaks
locally at the locations of Alice and Bob (although, under a
large enough PJ , Sx,y decreases as the location of Eve moves
along the x-axis from the origin towards Alice or Bob initially
when the condition of Property 11 holds). This property is
clearly visible in Fig. 14, but is difficult to see in 15. The
latter is because the regions R4 ∪ RPJ (around Alice) and
R¯4 ∪ R¯PJ (around Bob) with ρ = 0.01 are too small within
which the variation of Sx,y is small.
B. With small-scale fading
With small-scale fading, the secrecy capacity is still given
by (34) but with
SNRA,B =
A˜PT
1 + ρB˜1PJ
(50)
SNRB,A =
A˜PT
1 + ρB˜2PJ
(51)
SNRA,E =
aC˜PT
1 + bD˜PJ
(52)
SNRB,E =
bD˜PT
1 + aC˜PJ
(53)
where the small-scale fading factors are illustrated in Fig.
16. In particular, we assume that A˜ is the same for either
transmission from Alice to Bob or transmission from Bob
to Alice (justified by the reciprocal property of electro-
magnetics). We treat B˜1 and B˜2 as different small-scale fading
factors because the self-interference at Alice and that at Bob
are affected differently by surrounding scattering objects due
to the location difference of Alice and Bob. As in the previous
section, we will assume that all small-scale fading factors
are i.i.d. exponentially distributed with unit mean. Keep in
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Fig. 16. Illustration of small-scale fading factors for fJam.
Fig. 17. Illustration of the integrated (shaded) area in (55).
mind that Alice and Bob can make decisions based on the
knowledge of A˜, B˜1 and B˜2.
It follows that Sx,y = 0 iff CA,B ≤ CA,E and CB,A ≤
CB,E or equivalently iff{
C˜ − v1D˜ − v2 ≥ 0,
D˜ − u1C˜ − u2 ≥ 0. (54)
where v1 = bA˜PJa(1+ρB˜1PJ ) , v2 =
A˜
a(1+ρB˜1PJ )
, u1 = aA˜PJb(1+ρB˜2PJ )
and u2 = A˜b(1+ρB˜2PJ ) . The pair of inequalities in (54)
corresponds to the shaded area in Fig. 17. Then, the probability
of zero secrecy conditional upon A˜, B˜1 and B˜2 is
P{Sx,y=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2} =
∫ ∞
cmin
dx
∫ x−v2
v1
u1x+u2
e−x−ydy
=
1
1 + u1
e−u2−(1+u1)cmin − 1
1 + 1v1
e
v2
v1
−(1+ 1v1 )cmin
(55)
where
cmin =
{ v2+v1u2
1−v1u1 , v1u1 < 1∞ otherwise (56)
One can further verify from (17) and (56) that
P{Sx,y=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2} =
{
Ke−E , w1 > 0
0 otherwise (57)
where K = w1w2 , E =
w3
w1
and
w1 = ab[(1 + ρB˜1PJ)(1 + ρB˜2PJ)− A˜2P 2J ] (58)
w2 = [aA˜PJ + b(1 + ρB˜2PJ)][bA˜PJ + a(1 + ρB˜1PJ)] (59)
w3 = A˜[a(1+ρB˜1PJ)+b(1+ρB˜2PJ)+bA˜PJ+aA˜PJ ] (60)
Property 17: With zero jamming power, the unconditional
probability of zero secrecy anywhere is upper bounded by that
at origin, i.e.,
P{Sx,y=0|PJ=0} ≤ P{S0,0=0|PJ=0} =
1
1 + 0.5α−1
(61)
Also, for an Eve arbitrarily close to Alice or Bob, we have
P{S±0.5,0=0|PJ=0} = 0.5.
Proof: If PJ = 0, then K = 1 and E = A˜a+bab .
Hence P{Sx,y=0|PJ=0} = E{P{Sx,y=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2,PJ=0}} =
E{e−A˜ a+bab } = 1
1+ a+bab
. Given a, a+bab is a decreasing function
of b. So, for any given dA, maxx,y P{Sx,y=0|PJ=0} is achieved
by the smallest dB . So, maxx,y P{Sx,y=0|PJ=0} is achieved
only if y = 0. Now consider y = 0 and P{Sx,0=0|PJ=0} =
1
1+|x+0.5|α+|x−0.5|α which is symmetric of x and has its peak
at x = 0. And obviously P{S±0.5,0=0|PJ=0} = 0.5.
If PJ =∞,
K =
ab(ρ2B˜1B˜2 − A˜2)
(aA˜+ ρbB˜2)(bA˜+ ρaB˜1)
(62)
E =
A˜(ρaB˜1 + ρbB˜2 + bA˜+ aA˜)
ab(ρ2B˜1B˜2 − A˜2)PJ
→ 0 (63)
Hence,
P{Sx,y=0|PJ=∞} = E{K}
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ρ√uv
0
Ke−u−v−wdudvdw (64)
where the random variables A˜, B˜1, B˜2 in K should be re-
placed by the dummy variables w, u, v respectively (this
rule will be used again later). Note that arg maxx,yK is
generally a function of A˜, B˜1 and B˜2. Unlike the case of
PJ = 0, it seems intractable to find an analytical form of
arg maxx,y P{Sx,y=0|PJ=∞}.
For the general case of PJ > 0, searching for the worst
location of Eve in terms of P{Sx,y=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2} or P{Sx,y=0} is
also hard. But the following special case should be of interest:
Property 18: If PJ > 0 and Eve is arbitrarily close to
Alice or Bob, then the probability of zero secrecy is zero,
i.e., P{S±0.5,0=0|PJ>0} = 0.
Proof: Assume any PJ > 0. At (x, y) = (0.5, 0), we
have a = 1 and b = ∞, and hence v1 = ∞, v2 = A˜1+ρB˜PJ ,
u1 = 0 and u2 = 0. In this case, v1u1 is not defined and the
previous derivation does not apply. To see the corresponding
result, we consider the necessary condition for zero secrecy:
C − v1D − v2 ≥ 0, which now holds with zero probability
(since v1 = ∞). Hence, P{S±0.5,0=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2,PJ>0} = 0 and
hence P{S±0.5,0=0|PJ>0} = 0.
Property 18 is in contrast to the case of colluding Eves
where the probability of zero secrecy at Alice is always one.
See Part 3 in Property 8.
Property 19: Iff A˜2 > ρ2B˜1B˜2: then there is a P ∗J > 0
such that iff PJ ≥ P ∗J , P{Sx,y=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2} = 0, where
P ∗J =
ρ(B˜1 + B˜2) +
√
ρ2(B˜1 + B˜2)2 + 4(A˜2 − ρ2B˜1B˜2)
2(A˜2 − ρ2B˜1B˜2)
(65)
Namely, iff A˜2 > ρ2B˜1B˜2, Alice and Bob can choose a PJ to
make the probability of zero secrecy equal to zero anywhere.
Proof: The proof follows from (57) and (58).
Property 19 can be used for dynamic control of jamming
power. A semi-dynamic control is: Alice and Bob choose
PJ = P
∗
J if A˜
2 > ρ2B˜1B˜2, or a constant PJ if A˜2 ≤ ρ2B˜1B˜2.
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Property 20: With the above semi-dynamic control of
jamming power, we have
P{Sx,y=0} =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ρ√uv
0
Ke−Ee−u−v−wdudvdw < P1
(66)
with P1 = Prob{A˜2 ≤ ρ2B˜1B˜2}, i.e.,
P1 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−u−v[1− e−ρ
√
uv]dudv <
piρ
4
(67)
where the last inequality becomes tight as ρ becomes small.
Proof: P{Sx,y=0} is the expectation of P{Sx,y=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2}
in (57) subject to A˜2 ≤ ρ2B˜1B˜2. Using Ke−E < 1, we have
P{Sx,y=0} < P1 .=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ρ√uv
0
e−u−v−wdudvdw
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−u−v[1− e−ρ
√
uv]dudv
<
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−u−vρ
√
uvdudv =
piρ
4
(68)
where the second inequality is due to 1−e−z < z for any z >
0, and the last equality follows from the fact
∫∞
0
e−u
√
udu =√
pi
2 . This fact can be proved by using the change of variable
u = v
2
2 , which leads to
∫∞
0
e−u
√
udu =
√
pi
2 σ
2 where σ2 =
2√
2pi
∫∞
0
v2e−
v2
2 dv = 1 which is known as the variance of a
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit variance.
Property 21: If PJ is a constant regardless of A˜2 >
ρ2B˜1B˜2, then
P{Sx,y=0} =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ w0
0
Ke−Ee−u−v−wdudvdw < P2
(69)
where w0 =
√
ρ2uv + 1+ρ(u+v)PJ
P 2J
and
P2 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−u−v
[
1− e−w0] dudv > P1 (70)
and for PJ =∞, P1 = P2.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Property 20.
Illustrated in Fig. 18 are the probabilities shown in Proper-
ties 20 and 21. We see that the benefit from the semi-dynamic
jamming power control is significant when PJ is small. But
when PJ is large, the benefit diminishes.
In scattering-rich environment, if Alice and Bob both move
in random directions with a distance in the order of half-
wavelength, all of A˜, B˜1 and B˜2 could change substantially
and independently. In MANET, Alice and Bob could move
around and do not exchange any secret key till they find
A˜2 > ρ2B˜1B˜2, and only then they exchange secret keys with
PJ = P
∗
J . We call this a full-dynamic control of jamming
power, for which the probability of zero secrecy is simply
zero. Compared to the semi-dynamic control, the full-dynamic
control has a larger latency and also potentially consumes more
jamming power. Also note that the probability for the condition
A˜2 > ρ2B˜1B˜2 to hold is 1− P1 > 1− piρ4 . So, if ρ is small,
Alice and Bob will find that condition satisfied frequently.
Alternatively, if PJ is limited, Alice and Bob can wait till
P{Sx,y=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2} shown in (55) at a worst location of Eve is
Fig. 18. Probabilities shown in Properties 20 and 21 where α = 2, ρ = 0.1.
The “constant bound” is piρ
4
. The meanings of other symbols should be self-
evident. For location-dependent probabilities, we choose (x, y) = (0, 0) and
(x, y) = (−0.6, 0).
Fig. 19. CDF of P{Sx,y=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2} with α = 2, ρ = 0.1 and (x, y) =
(0, 0).
small enough (instead of zero). We call this a general-dynamic
control. Shown in Fig. 19 are the CDFs of P{Sx,y=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2}
at x = y = 0, based on 10000 realizations of A˜, B˜1, B˜2.
We see that even when PJ is only zero dB (i.e., equal to the
variance of the background noise), there is more than 10%
chance that P{Sx,y=0|A˜,B˜1,B˜2} is less than 10−4. These CDFs
should have a direct impact on the latency of the general-
dynamic control.
Property 22: If PJ =
√
PT
ρ which is invariant to (x, y),
ρ < ∆
α
(1+∆)α , 1 > dA > ∆, 1 > dB > ∆, and ∆
α
√
ρPT  1,
then with a high probability,
Sx,y ≈ log2
A˜
ρ
√
B˜1B˜2
(71)
which is invariant to (x, y). And under the above conditions,
Prob {Sx,y ≤ s} < 2
sρpi
4
(72)
Proof: Proof of (71) is similar to that of Property 15.
Proof of (72) is similar to that of (68).
The result (71) says that under a large PT , a small ρ
and PJ =
√
PT
ρ , there is a constant near-field secrecy
capacity conditional upon A˜, B˜1 and B˜2. Illustrated in Figs.
20 and 21 is Sx,y versus (x, y) in the near-field subject to
A˜ = B˜1 = B˜2 = 1 where C˜ and D˜ change randomly and
independently as (x, y) changes (with step size equal to 0.01
in each direction). As predicted by Property 22, we see that
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Fig. 20. With small-scale fading and subject to A˜ = B˜1 = B˜2 = 1, Sx,y
vs (x, y). For each (x, y), there is a new realization of C˜ and D˜. α = 2,
ρ = 0.1, PJ =
√
PT
ρ
.
Fig. 21. With small-scale fading and subject to A˜ = B˜1 = B˜2 = 1, Sx,y
vs (x, y). For each (x, y), there is a new realization of C˜ and D˜. α = 2,
ρ = 0.01, PJ =
√
PT
ρ
.
with PT = 60dB and ρ = 0.01, there is very little variation
in the near-field distribution of Sx,y .
Since Sx,y in (71) still depends on A˜, B˜1 and B˜2, Alice
and Bob could ideally wait till A˜√
B˜1B˜2
is maximized before
exchanging any keys. This is however not possible due to
non-causality in knowing the future realizations of small-
scale fading. In practice, Alice and Bob should only wait
until log2
A˜
ρ
√
B˜1B˜2
is a large enough positive number. The
result in (72) provides an upper bound on the probability
that log2
A˜
ρ
√
B˜1B˜2
is no larger than a pre-specified value s
of secrecy. Obviously, this upper bound on the right side of
(72) can be made small if ρ is small enough. It is equivalent to
write (72) as Prob {Sx,y > s} > 1 − 2
sρpi
4 , which quantifies
how to make the constant near-field secrecy capacity larger
than a pre-specified value s with high probability by choosing
a small enough normalized self-interference channel gain ρ.
Remember that under a fixed actual self-interference channel
gain ρ′, the value of ρ can be controlled by controlling the
actual distance (or actual channel gain) between Alice and
Bob. Such a control is feasible in mobile wireless networks.
V. FINAL REMARKS
Full-duplex radio is an emerging wireless communication
technology with many potential applications. This paper ad-
dresses its use for secure wireless communication. Unlike
many previous works for this purpose, we have examined the
fundamental properties of full-duplex radio for secure wireless
communication where the legitimate users have virtually zero
knowledge of the channel state information of eavesdroppers.
Among the important findings are how the secrecy capacity
of a link between two single-antenna radios is distributed
in space with or without collusion among eavesdroppers,
how the residual self-interference channel gain of full-duplex
radio affects the distribution of the secrecy capacity, and
how the small-scale fading affects the probabilities of zero
(or positive) secrecy. All of the major findings have been
quantified precisely and stated in a list of properties. Some
of these properties might not be surprising to some experts
in this area. But to our knowledge, none of these properties
is readily available elsewhere (from other authors). Indeed we
hope that all of them are original and insightful. We also hope
that this work will be useful for helping real-world applica-
tions and more importantly for inspiring further research in
understanding the limits and potentials of full-duplex radio
for secure wireless communication in more advanced network
settings.
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